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Parental Inmmunity-AuToMoBILE NEGLIGENCE-France V. A.P.A.
Transport Corp.
An action between a parent and his minor child was not prohibited at
common law.' In fact, the child was allowed redress in matters concerning
his property.2 However, no action in tort for personal injuries was ever
recorded.'
When the issue first appeared in an American jurisdiction,4 recovery
was denied for reasons of public policy.' On the basis of that one decision,
other courts erroneously presumed the immunity to be a "common law
rule" 6 and refused to draw a line of demarcation even when an extreme
factual situation was presented.' The resulting American rule of parent-
child immunity for personal injury torts has been followed in the great
majority of states,' particularly in situations involving only ordinary negli-
'See, e.g., Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930). "The right of a child
to bring an action against his parent in respect to the latter's dealings wih his personal
property is unquestioned;" and although a tort action is not clearly authorized "there
is no rule of common law to prevent such action being brought." W. EVERSLEY,
DoMEsnc RELATIoNs 554 (6th ed. 1951).
2 See, e.g., Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Walker v. Crowder, 37 N.C. 478
(1843); Hall v. Hall, 44 N.H. 293 (1862); Ayer v. Ayer, 41 Vt. 302 (1868); W. PRossER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 886 (3d ed. 1964).
3Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 n.1 (1951).
4 Early cases in America indicated that the parent was subject to some personal
injury tort liability. See Gould v. Christianson, 10 F. Cas. 857 (No. 5636) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1836); Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt.
114, 76 Am. Dec. 156 (1859); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation,
43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1062 (1930).
5 Citing no authority, the Mississippi court denied an action by an unemancipated mi-
nor child against her mother for alleged malicious confinement in an insane asylum for
eleven days. See Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
6 See, e.g., Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); Kelly v. Kelly,
158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 SAV.
664 (1903).
-A fifteen year old girl was denied recovery against her father who had been
convicted and sentenced for raping her. See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788
(1905). The court explained that "if it be once established that a child has a right
to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line of demarkation [sic] which can
be drawn . . . ." Id. at 789.
Although no modern court would treat parental immunity as an absolute rule, the
influence of Roller may still be detected in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gunn v.
Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967) (action denied where parent was willful
and reckless).8 See generally McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. Rav. 521 (1960);
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
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gence.' However, a recent trend has been to confine parental immunity
to those activities strictly parental in the narrow sense."0
In France v. A. P. A. Transport Corp." the New Jersey Supreme Court
abandoned the parental immunity rule in automobile negligence cases.'2 A
collision between an automobile driven by Carrol E. France, Jr. and a truck
owned by A. P. A. Transport Corporation resulted in injuries to France's
two unemancipated minor children, who were passengers in his car. The
children sued A. P. A. Transport Corporation for personal injuries and
the defendant filed a counterclaim for contribution against the children's
father. The court held that the counterclaim was not barred by the parent-
child relationship because the reasons for immunity are no longer present
in automobile negligence cases.
The courts have recognized various reasons for parental immunity. The
argument considered most substantial has been that such actions disrupt
family peace and harmony." The France court, no longer convinced by this
9See, e.g., Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968); Begley v. Kohl and
Madden Printing Ink Co., 157 Conn. 445, 254 A.2d 907 (1969); Rickard v. Rickard,
203 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Barlow v. Iblings, 156 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa
1968); Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Groves v.
Groves, 158 S.E.2d 710 (W. Va. 1968).
0 See Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir.
1959).
Accordingly, Wisconsin has abrogated parent-child immunity except in two situations:-
"(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over
the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical
and dental services, and other care." Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193,
198 (1963); accord, Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
Other jurisdictions have allowed recovery for negligent conduct but have limited the
decision to the case at bar, declaring that each case must be decided on its own
peculiar facts. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967) (auto negligence);
Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970) (auto negligence). The practical effect
is probably total abrogation. Id. at 286 (dissenting opinion).
Only three states have expressly abrogated the immunity in toto. See Petersen v.
Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007 (Hawaii 1969); Tamashiro v. De Gama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450
P.2d 998 (1969); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 NZE.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969).
1156 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
12 The France decision overruled a line of New Jersey cases which had upheld the
immunity. However, the change is not so surprising in light of the fact that the
Supreme Court had been split 4-3 on the issue since 1960. See Franco v. Davis,
51 N.J. 237, 239 A.2d 1 (1968); Heyman v. Gordon, 40 N.J. 52, 190 A.2d 670 (1963);
Hastings v. Hastings, 33 N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
'
3 This argument has been employed since the earliest disposition of the issue. See
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argument, maintained that "the widespread use of liability insurance has
militated against the possibility that such suits will disrupt the domestic
peace . ,, 14 In a similar manner the court disposed of the argument that
the action allows depletion of the family exchequer in favor of the injured
child. 5 According to recent cases, the advent of liability insurance has
occasioned as another reason for immunity the possibility of fraud and
collusion."6 The France court considered the collusion argument, which
interestingly presumes the antithesis of the family harmony argument, 17
not sufficient in itself to justify immunity. 8
Some courts have maintained that an action by a child against his
parent would undermine parental authority 9 or is analogous to common
law interspousal immunity.2" Other reasons given in support of immunity
Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). "The peace of society, and of the
families composing society .... forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court
in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands
of the parent." Id. at 887. For cases echoing this policy, see Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind.
App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
14France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490, 493 (1970).
The impact of liability insurance on parent-child immunity has been much debated.
Some courts, like France, have stressed its practical effect on the reasons behind the
rule. See, e.g., Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E.
538 (1932). Other courts have held that the mere existence of liability insurance does
not give rise to an action where none was present without it. See, e.g., Signs v. Signs,
156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174
S.E. 841 (1934); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wash. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966).
'
5 See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). "[Ilt would not be
the policy of the law to allow the estate, which is to be looked to for the support of
all the minor children, to be appropriated by any particular one." Id. at 789.
16 See, e.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Luster v. Luster, 299
Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
17 The arguments are mutually exclusive. In order for there to be a danger that the
parent and his child will collude against an insurance company, some degree of harmony
must be assumed. See Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (this interspousal
decision involves the same policy questions as encountered in parental immunity);
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 154 (1952).
18Those courts which have rejected the fraud and collusion argument have empha-
sized the injustice of denying recovery purely because of family relationship and the
adequacy of our judicial system to uncover fraudulent claims. See, e.g., Tamashiro v.
De Gama, 51 Hawaii 74, 450 P.2d 998 (1969); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150
A. 905 (1930); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Midkiff v. Midkiff,
201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960) (intersibling suit).
19 See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Borst v. Borst, 41
Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). But see Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967).
20 See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); McKelvey v. McKelvey,
111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903). But see Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 1, 4 S.E.2d
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have included the possibility of succession, 1 the sovereign family govern-
ment concept,2 and an illogical and unsupported assumption that there
must have been immunity at common law since no case has been re-
ported.2" These arguments have been employed as "makeweights,"24 and
have not been regarded as individually justifying immunity.
Deviation from the rule of parental immunity is nothing new. Frequent
departure has been made in areas where special facts have been deemed to
remove the reasons for the rule. For example, a minor child, if emanci-
pated, was allowed recovery;2" or where the parent's conduct was charac-
terized as gross, willful or wanton, an exception was made; 6 or if the
child sued the estate of his deceased parent, the immunity was held no
longer applicable. Some courts have allowed recovery where the parent
was in a vocational capacity" or in a master-servant2 9 or carrier-pass-
enger 0 relationship with the child.
343 (1939); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAv. L. REv.
1030, 1074 (1930).
21 In the event of the child's death, the parent would become heir to the very prop-
erty wrested from him in such judgement. See Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
P. 788 (1905).
2 See Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Small v. Morrison, 185
N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) (concurring opinion); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R..
131, 131 A. 198 (1925).
However, this conception that the parent, like the king, can do no wrong, is
obsolete. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAzv. L. R~v. 1030, 1076 (1930).
23 See, e.g., Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
24 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930).
25 See, e.g., Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955);
Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d
745 (Mo. 1959); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953).
"'See, e.g., Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959);
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 I1. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Treschman v. Tresch-
man, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61,
77 A.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1951). But see Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590
(1967); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E.2d 170 (1953).27 Death of the parent removes the possibility that family harmony would be
disturbed by a tort action. See, e.g., Davis v. Smith, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1958);
Vidmar v. Sigmund, 192 Pa. Super. 355, 162 A.2d 15 (1960). But see Gunn v. Rollings,
250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967); Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 432 S.W.2d 894 (Tenn.
1968).
28 See, e.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). Borst v. Borst,
41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
20 See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
30 See Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va.
17, 166 S2. 538 (1932).
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The wisdom of the France decision is in its simplicity and restraint.
Rather than making nice distinctions which might breed more confusion
as to what "parental activities" may encompass,"' New Jersey has un-
equivocably placed the operation of an automobile outside those activi-
ties," whatever else they may include. Neither did France take the course
of total abrogation which, it is submitted, may be an overreaction to a
need for restricting the immunity to its proper sphere. France has dealt
parent-child immunity a fatal blow in the area of its most frequent and
inappropriate application-automobile negligence. There still remain
parental activities in which the child should not be allowed an action for
his parent's negligence." With France, parental immunity is properly con-
fined to those areas in which it is still justified.
J. W. P. III
31 There is little utility in restricting parent-child immunity to "parental activities"
without specifically deciding whether the operation of an automobile is such an
activity. The failure of courts to decide that basic question has been a shortcoming of
the trend in parental immunity and has led to confusion and uncertainty. See note 10
supra.
Countless situations arise in the operation of an automobile which may or may not be
strictly parental activities. Is the parent immune from suit if he drives negligently while
taking his child to school, but subject to liability if he is driving to keep his own
dental appointment? Frequently, the automobile is being operated for a multiplicity of
purposes, only one of which may be "parental" in nature. What is the result in that
situation? Authoritative answers can be supplied only by litigation. See generally
H. CLARKE, THE LAW OF DoMESTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATEs 256-60 (1968).
32 It has been urged previously that the operation of an automobile would require
a specific solution in the area of parent-child immunity. See Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa.
287, 135 A.2d 65, 81 (1957) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); McCurdy, Torts Between
Parent and Child, 5 VILL. L. REv. 521, 559 (1960).
33 Life within the family unit requires frequent interaction of parent and child. To
attach tort liability for negligent conduct in all facets of the relationship would be to
seriously impede if not defeat its function.
"Liability lurks in every corner of the household." Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282,
286 (Ariz. 1970) (dissenting opinion). The examples are infinite: an aspirin bottle is
inadvertantly left within the child's reach; water boiling on the stove is left unattended
while mother pays the newsboy; a frayed electrical cord is carelessly left unrepaired.
See generally Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 131 A. 198 (1925).
